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1. Introduction
Realizability is a technique to extract computational content from formal proofs. It has been widely used 
to analyze intuitionistic systems (for e.g. higher-order arithmetic or set theory), see [23] for a survey. Follow-
ing Griﬃn’s computational interpretation of Peirce’s law [8], Krivine developed in [13,14,12] a realizability 
for second-order classical arithmetic and Zermelo–Frænkel set theory.
On the other hand, Hyland–Ong game semantics provide precise models of various programming lan-
guages such as PCF [11] (a similar model has simultaneously been obtained in [21]), also augmented with 
control operators [15] and higher-order references [1]. In these games, plays are interactions traces between a 
program (player P ) and an environment (opponent O). A program is interpreted by a strategy for P which 
represents the interactions it can have with any environment.
In this paper, we devise a notion of realizability for HON general games based on winning conditions on 
desequentialized plays, deﬁned using the thick subtrees of [5]. We show that our model is sound for classical 
Peano arithmetic and allows to perform extraction for Π02-formulas.
E-mail address: v.blot@bath.ac.uk.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apal.2016.10.006
0168-0072/© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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logic with ﬁxpoints. These conditions have then been generalized in [4] to handle full ﬁrst-order classical 
logic, while [6] only deals with totality. In this paper we reformulate the winning conditions of [4] as sets of 
positions rather than sets of plays, emphasizing the fact that winning conditions are blind to the sequentiality 
information of plays. Classical logic is handled similarly to the unbracketed game model of PCF of [15].
We start from the cartesian closed category of single-threaded strategies which contains the unbracketed 
and non-innocent strategies used to model control operators and references. Applying the coproduct com-
pletion of [2] to this category gives a response category [22]. If we choose smartly the object of responses, 
the corresponding category of continuations is isomorphic to the ﬁrst category and makes clear that the 
usual ﬂat arena of natural numbers in HON games is indeed in the image of a negative translation. Our 
realizability is then obtained by equipping arenas with winning conditions on positions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notion of thick subtrees and positions, states 
the equivalence with the usual game semantics framework and shows how to interpret λμ-calculus in the 
category of games. Section 3 deﬁnes the notion of winning strategies. Section 4 contains the deﬁnition of our 
realizability relation and its adequacy for classical logic. Section 5 introduces the relativization predicate, 
applies our realizability model to Peano arithmetic and shows witness extraction for Π02-formulas.
2. HON games
Our realizability model is based on the Hyland–Ong–Nickau games [11] with no bracketing or innocence 
constraint, so as to model control operators [15] and references [1]. We consider single-threaded strategies 
in order to have a cartesian closed category.
2.1. Arenas
Here we deﬁne arenas, which are forests of moves. Arenas are the objects of the category of HON games.
A forest is a partial order (E,≤) such that ∀x ∈ E, {y ∈ E | y < x} is well-ordered. The binary relation 
<1 on E is then deﬁned as:
∀x, y ∈ E x <1 y ⇐⇒ x < y ∧ ∀z (x < z < y ⇒ z = x ∨ z = y)
x <1 y means that y is a direct child of x. The roots of a forest correspond to the minimal elements for ≤.
Deﬁnition 1 (Arena). An arena is a countably branching, ﬁnite-depth forest whose nodes are called moves. 
Each move is given a polarity O (for Opponent) or P (for Player or Proponent):
• The roots are of polarity O
• If x <1 y then x and y are of opposite polarities
A root of an arena is also called an initial move. We will often identify an arena with its set of moves. 
Here is an example of arena, the polarities of the moves being given on the left:
O a f
P b c g h
O d e
(1)
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In usual game semantics [11], interaction sequences are deﬁned as words of moves with pointers between 
them. Here we ﬁrst deﬁne what is a position on an arena, using the thick subtrees of [5], and the interac-
tion sequences are just positions together with a sequentiality information. This choice is justiﬁed by the 
positional nature of our winning conditions.
2.2.1. Interaction sequences as thick subtrees
We choose to deﬁne the positions on arenas using the thick subtrees of [5], extended to handle the case of 
forests. This formalism is a nice way to deal with non-aﬃne programs: programs that may use several times 
their arguments. A thick subtree of a given tree is a subtree which can be extended in width, meaning that 
branches of the initial tree can be duplicated. These duplications correspond to the distinct computations 
of arguments during the execution of a non-aﬃne program.
Deﬁnition 2 (State). Given an arena A, a state on A is a thick subforest of A, that is a forest s together 
with a labeling function l : s → A such that:
∀x ∈ s, {l (y) | y < x} = {z ∈ A | z < l (x)}
This condition ensures that the roots are mapped to roots, and that the relation <1 is preserved. Here is 
an example of a state on the arena 1:
a a f
b b b h
d e e
(2)
The nodes are considered distinct, even if they have the same label. By deﬁnition of the polarity, the roots 
of a justiﬁed sequence are labeled with O-moves, and if x <1 y, then the labels of x and y are of opposite 
polarities.
We denote the empty state by . If A is an arena, X is a subset of A (with the restricted ordering) and 
s is a state on A, then s|X is the state on X whose set of nodes is l−1(X) (where l : s → A is the labeling 
of the state), with the restricted ordering. It is immediate to check that it is a state on X.
Deﬁnition 3 (Position). A position on an arena is a state which is a tree (i.e. it has a unique root). If s is a 
state on an arena A, the set of positions of s, Pos (s), is the set of trees composing the state.
For example, the set of positions of the state 2 is:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
a
b b
d
;
a
b
e e
;
f
h
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
A state s is a position if and only if Pos (s) = {s}. Remark that Pos () = ∅, so  is not a position. Our 
notion of position can be seen as an attempt to give a positional account of game semantics, as in [19], but 
in a quite diﬀerent way.
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Deﬁnition 4 (Justiﬁed sequence). Given an arena A, we deﬁne a justiﬁed sequence on A to be a state (ﬁnite 
of inﬁnite) s on A equipped with a total order ≺ of type at most ω.1 Moreover, a justiﬁed sequence must 
verify:
∀x, y ∈ s x < y ⇒ x ≺ y
The partial order < of a justiﬁed sequence corresponds to the pointers of usual game semantics settings: 
x <1 y corresponds to y pointing to x. The total order ≺ corresponds to the sequentiality of moves. The 
coherence condition of justiﬁed sequences means that if there is a pointer from a move y to a move x in the 
sequence, then x must have been played before y. The fact that x must be the father of y comes from the 
deﬁnition of a state.
Here is an example of a justiﬁed sequence on the arena 1:
(a, 1) (a, 3) (f, 8)
(b, 2) (b, 4) (b, 5) (h, 10)
(d, 7) (e, 6) (e, 9)
(3)
Where the labeling is given by the ﬁrst components and the injection to natural numbers by the second 
components. The empty justiﬁed sequence will be denoted , like the empty state. In the following we will 
allow ourselves to consider justiﬁed sequences as words of moves, without explicitly mentioning it. By the 
coherence condition of justiﬁed sequences, the minimal element for ≺ is always a minimal element for <, 
and therefore labeled with a root of the arena. We can map any justiﬁed sequence to a state by forgetting 
the sequentiality information, so in the following we will freely consider that a justiﬁed sequence is a state. 
For example the state corresponding to the justiﬁed sequence 3 is the state 2.
2.2.2. Correspondence with the usual setting
In usual game semantics settings like [11], the justiﬁed sequences are words of moves with pointers 
between them. For example, the justiﬁed sequence 3 would be represented as:
a b a b b e d f e h
We prove here the correspondence between our notion of justiﬁed sequence and the usual one of pointed 
sequence.
Deﬁnition 5 (Pointed sequence). A (potentially inﬁnite) pointed sequence on an arena A is a word s of A
together with a partial pointing function f : |s| ⇀ |s| such that:
• If f (i) is undeﬁned then si is a root of A
• If f (i) is deﬁned then f (i) < i and sf(i) <1 si (as elements of A)
1 This means that ≺ can be described by an injection to natural numbers.
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the corresponding justiﬁed sequence Just (s) as the thick subforest of A whose nodes are (si, i), the order 
< of the forest is deﬁned as:
(si, i) < (sj , j) ⇐⇒ ∃n > 0, fn (j) = i
the labeling function is given by the ﬁrst components and the order ≺ is given by the second components.
Lemma 1. If s is a pointed sequence with pointing function f , then Just (s) is a state.
Proof. Let (sj , j) be a node. We have to prove:
{si | (si, i) < (sj , j)} = {x ∈ A | x < sj}
For the left-to-right inclusion, if (si, i) < (sj , j) then by deﬁnition there is some n > 0 such that fn (j) = i, 
so by the deﬁnition of a pointed sequence, in A we have si = sfn(j) <1 sfn−1(j) <1 . . . <1 sf(j) <1 sj , 
and therefore si < sj . For the right-to-left inclusion, since an arena has ﬁnite depth, {x ∈ A | x < sj} is 
ﬁnite, and it is also a well-order (by deﬁnition of a forest), so there are xn <1 . . . <1 x1 ∈ A such that 
{x ∈ A | x < sj} = {x1; . . . ;xn}. If x ∈ A is such that x < sj , then x = xk for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and then 
x = sfk(j). Moreover, by deﬁnition 
(
sfk(j), f
k (j)
)
< (sj , j) so we conclude. 
Lemma 2. If s is a pointed sequence with pointing function f , then Just (s) is a justiﬁed sequence.
Proof. We only have to prove that if (si, i) < (sj , j), then i < j. Indeed, if (si, i) < (sj , j), then by deﬁnition 
fn (j) = i for some n > 0, but since f (k) < k as soon as f (k) is deﬁned, we get immediately i < j. 
From justiﬁed sequences to pointed sequences If s is a justiﬁed sequence with labeling l we deﬁne here the 
corresponding pointed sequence Point (s). We can order the elements of s using the total ordering ≺, which 
is of type at most ω, and obtain a (possibly inﬁnite) sequence l (x0) . . . l (xn) . . . such that xi ≺ xj ⇔ i < j, 
which is the word of moves of Point (s). We now deﬁne the pointing function f of Point (s). If xi ∈ s, there 
are two cases. Either {xj ∈ s | xj < xi} = ∅, in which case f (i) is left undeﬁned, either there is a unique 
xj ∈ s such that xj <1 xi, in which case we deﬁne f (i) = j.
Lemma 3. If s is a justiﬁed sequence with labeling l, then Point (s) is a pointed sequence.
Proof. Let f be the pointing function of Point (s). If f (i) is undeﬁned, then {xj ∈ s | xj < xi} = ∅, but 
then:
{x ∈ A | x < l (xi)} = {l (xj) | xj < xi} = ∅
so l (xi) is a root of A. If f (i) = j, then xj <1 xi so xj < xi and xj ≺ xi by deﬁnition of a justiﬁed sequence. 
By deﬁnition of the ordering that we chose, this means that j < i. Moreover, by deﬁnition of a state, since 
xj <1 xi we get also l (xj) <1 l (xi). 
Equivalence of the two notions The two transformations above, from pointed sequences to justiﬁed se-
quences, and from justiﬁed sequences to pointed sequences, can be composed. We can prove that for any 
pointed sequence s, Point (Just (s)) = s, and for any justiﬁed sequence s, Just (Point (s)) = s. Justiﬁed se-
quences are in one-to-one correspondence with usual pointed sequences. In the following we will sometimes 
use “sequence” instead of “justiﬁed sequence”.
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Deﬁnition 6 (Thread). A thread on an arena is a sequence which, as a state, is a position. If s is a sequence 
on an arena A, the set of threads of s, Threads (s), is the set of trees composing the sequence.
Warning. Note that a thread is a sequence which may not be alternating (see the deﬁnition of play), so 
our deﬁnition of thread diﬀers from the usual one.
The threads are the analogue of positions but for sequences. A sequence s is a thread if it contains exactly 
one thread (i.e. Threads (s) = {s}). Remark that Threads () = ∅ and so  is not a thread. As for sequences, 
we will freely consider that a thread is a position.
Deﬁnition 7 (Play). A play s on A is an alternating sequence on A, i.e., the sequence of labels of the nodes 
ordered by ≺ has alternating polarities.
A play on an arena is the trace of an interaction between a program and a context, each one performing 
an action alternatively. A P -play (resp. O-play) is a ﬁnite play whose maximal element for ≺ is labeled with 
a P -move (resp. O-move), this means that as a word, it ends with a P -move (resp. O-move). If s and t are 
plays, write t  s if t is an initial segment of s for ≺ (with the order < restricted accordingly). This means 
that t is a preﬁx of s as a word, and their pointers coincide. Write t P s (resp. t O s) if t is a P -preﬁx 
(resp. O-preﬁx) of s, i.e. t  s and t is a P -play (resp. O-play). Write t P s (resp. t O s) if t P s (resp. 
t O s) and t = s.
Deﬁnition 8 (Strategy). A strategy σ on A is a P -preﬁx-closed set of (ﬁnite) P -plays on A such that:
• σ is deterministic: if sm and sm′ are in σ, then m = m′
• σ is single-threaded: for any P -play s, s ∈ σ ⇔ Threads (s) ⊆ σ
Our notion of single-threadedness of strategies matches the usual one of thread-independence (see e.g. [1]). 
Also, a strategy always contains the empty play  since Threads () = ∅.
2.4. Cartesian closed structure
The constructions we use will sometimes contain multiple copies of the same arena (for example A → A), 
so we distinguish the instances with superscripts (for example A(1) → A(2)).
Let U be the empty arena and V be the arena with only one (opponent) move. If A and B are arenas 
consisting of the trees A1 . . .Ap and B1 . . .Bq, then the arenas A → B and A × B can be represented as 
follows:
A → B : A × B :
B1
A(1)1
· · · A(1)p
Bq
A(q)1
· · · A(q)p
A1 · · · Ap B1 · · · Bq
The constructions described here deﬁne a cartesian closed category whose objects are arenas and morphisms 
are strategies. In the following this category will be denoted as C. Details of the construction can be found 
in [9] and we only give a description of application and pairing of strategies:
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σ (τ) on B is:
σ (τ) =
{
s|B | s ∈ σ, s|A ∈ τ and s|B play on B
}
Lemma 5 (Pairing). Let σ be a strategy on arena A and τ be a strategy on arena B. The strategy 〈σ, τ〉 on 
A × B is:
〈σ, τ〉 = {s play on A × B | s|A ∈ σ and s|B ∈ τ}
These deﬁnitions of arenas will be used to associate arenas to the following simple types:
Deﬁnition 9 (Simple types). The simple types are deﬁned by the following grammar, where ι is the unique 
base type:
T,U ::= ι | void | unit | T × U | T → U
We suppose given an object ι of C to interpret the base type, and we associate to each simple type T
an object T  of C as follows:
void = V unit = U T × U = T  × U T → U = UT 
Since C is cartesian closed, we can use the syntax of λ-calculus to deﬁne strategies from other strategies. 
In order to distinguish this notation from the λμ-terms of Sect. 2.6 we use a bold lambda λ. The type 
constant void is not essential for interpreting simply-typed λ-calculus in cartesian-closed C, however it will 
become necessary for typing λμ-calculus in Sect. 2.6, and the interpretation of void as the one-move arena 
V is essential for the continuation structure of C presented in Sect. 2.5.
2.5. Category of continuations
We map classical proofs to strategies using the interpretation of call-by-name λμ-calculus in categories 
of continuations described in [22]. In order to see the category C deﬁned in Sect. 2.4 as a category of 
continuations, we use the Fam construction, a variant of the coproduct completion described in [2], so C is 
isomorphic to RFam(C) for some well-chosen object R of Fam (C). The Fam construction is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 10 (Fam (C)). The objects of Fam (C) are families of objects of C indexed by at most countable 
sets. A morphism from {Ai | i ∈ I} to {Bj | j ∈ J} is a function f : I → J together with a family of 
morphisms of C from Ai to Bf(i), for i ∈ I.
Remark here that we diﬀer from [2] because C doesn’t have weak coproducts nor all small products, and 
the families are countable. Thus Fam(C) is not bicartesian closed, but since C is cartesian closed and has 
countable products, Fam (C) is still a distributive category with ﬁnite products and coproducts, and has 
exponentials of all singleton families. The empty product and terminal object is the singleton family {U}, 
the empty sum and initial object is the empty family {}, and:
{Ai | i ∈ I} × {Bj | j ∈ J} = {Ai × Bj | (i, j) ∈ I × J}
{Ai | i ∈ I} + {Bj | j ∈ J} = {Ck | k ∈ I unionmulti J} where Ck =
{
Ak if k ∈ I
Bk if k ∈ J
{B0}{Ai|i∈I} =
{
Πi∈IBAi0
}
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R = {V} = {void}
which is an object of Fam (C) as a singleton family. R has all exponentials as stated above. Fam (C) is a 
response category and RFam(C), the full subcategory of Fam (C) consisting of the objects of the form RA, is a 
category of continuations (see [22]). The objects of RFam(C) are singleton families, and RFam(C) is isomorphic 
to C. We will consider that objects and morphisms of RFam(C) are arenas and strategies and we will use the 
vocabulary deﬁned at the end of Sect. 2.4 on RFam(C) also.
2.6. Interpreting the call-by-name λμ-calculus
The types of λμ-calculus are the simple types of Deﬁnition 9. Let kT range over a set of typed constants 
and xT (resp. αT ) range over a countable set of variables (resp. names) for each type T . The grammar of 
λμ-terms is the following:
M,N ::= kT | xT | ∗ | 〈M,N〉 | π1M | π2M | λxT .M | M N | μαT .M |
[
αT
]
M
The typing rules can be found in [22], where our unit is their , our × is their ∧ and our void is their ⊥. 
For instance, the Law of Peirce is the type of the following closed term (we omit the type annotation of the 
variables).
λx.μα. [α] s (λy.μβ. [α] y) of type ((T → U) → T ) → T (4)
This λμ-term will be denoted cc.
We follow [22] to interpret call-by-name λμ-calculus in RFam(C). In particular if M is a λμ-term of 
type T with free variables in xT11 , . . . , xTnn and no free name, then its interpretation is a morphism M
from T1 × . . . × Tn to T . This morphism coincides with the interpretation of the call-by-name CPS 
translation of M (deﬁned in [22]) in the cartesian closed category RFam(C). See [22] for details. As stated 
in [22], if two terms are equivalent under the call-by-name semantics of λμ-calculus, or equivalently if their 
call-by-name CPS translations are βη-equivalent, then their interpretations are the same.
In the following we will drop the double brackets for the interpretation of simple types.
3. Winning conditions on arenas
We will now deﬁne our notion of realizability. We equip arenas with winning conditions on positions. 
Realizers are then winning strategies, intuitively strategies whose positions are all winning.
It is well-known that preservation of totality by composition of strategies is problematic in game se-
mantics. Luckily we do not need to preserve totality, but only winningness. We thus do not impose any 
totality condition on strategies, but when it turns to the deﬁnition of winning positions, we have to take 
into account all maximal positions, including both inﬁnite and odd-length ones. This leads to the notion of 
winning strategy proposed in Deﬁnition 15.
In order to deﬁne the notion of winning condition on an arena we introduce the notion of P -subposition 
and O-subposition:
Deﬁnition 11 (P -subposition, O-subposition). If t is a position and u is a downward-closed subset of t
(therefore it is a position), then u is a:
• P -subposition of t if when nP <1 mO in t and nP ∈ u, then mO ∈ u
• O-subposition of t if when nO <1 mP in t and nO ∈ u, then mP ∈ u
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player move must be kept), and an O-subposition is a weakening of opponent (but any answer of player to an 
opponent move must be kept). A P -subposition (resp. an O-subposition) is obtained from a given position 
by cutting some subtrees whose roots are labeled with P -moves (resp. O-moves). Here is an example of a 
position together with a P -subposition and an O-subposition:
Polarities Arena Position P -subposition O-subposition
O
P
O
P
a
b c
d e
f
a
b b c
d e e
f f
a
b c
d e
f
a
b b c
e
Now we can deﬁne the notion of winning condition on an arena:
Deﬁnition 12 (Winning condition). A winning condition on A is a set W of positions on A such that:
• If t is a position on A and if some P -subposition of t is in W, then t ∈ W.
• If t ∈ W then all the O-subpositions of t are in W.
A winning position must be thought as a position that is winning for player. Under this interpretation, 
the two requirements read as: if some player-weakening of a position is already winning, then the full 
position is also winning, and if a position is winning, then any opponent-weakening of that position is all 
the more winning. The deﬁnition of the ﬁrst stability constraint on winning conditions is motivated by our 
goal of interpreting classical logic. Indeed, Lemma 10 combined with this condition proves the validity of 
the strategy interpreting the call/cc operator with respect to the law of Peirce. The second condition is 
dual to the ﬁrst and is necessary for the stability of winning conditions through the arrow construction, 
proved in Lemma 6.
A state s (and by extension a sequence or a play) on the arena A equipped with the winning condition W
is said to be winning if Pos (s) ⊆ W, which is consistent with the interpretation of “winning” as “winning 
for P”. Our notion of winning state can be seen as a generalization of the ones deﬁned in [6] and [10]. In 
order to obtain a realizability model of ﬁrst-order logic, the notion of winning ﬁnite state is non-trivial and 
there can be odd-length plays which are winning and even-length plays which are losing. Winning conditions 
were also deﬁned in [17] using payoﬀs on positions, but with diﬀerent purposes, and in the framework of 
asynchronous games.
Remark that if t is a position on A → B, then t|B is a position on B, so t|B is winning iﬀ t|B ∈ WB, and 
if t is a position on A × B, then t is either a position on A, either a position on B.
Deﬁnition 13 (Arrow and product of winning conditions). If WA and WB are sets of positions on the arenas 
A and B, then we deﬁne:
WA→B =
{
t position on A → B | Pos (t|A) ⊆ WA ⇒ t|B ∈ WB}
WA×B =
{
t position on A × B | t position on A ⇒ t ∈ WA
t position on B ⇒ t ∈ WB
}
Lemma 6. If WA and WB are winning conditions on A and B, then WA→B is a winning condition on A → B
and WA×B is a winning condition on A × B.
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• Let t be a position on A → B and let u be a P -subposition of t such that u ∈ WA→B. Suppose that 
Pos
(
t|A
) ⊆ WA. If v ∈ Pos (u|A) then v is a O-subposition of some w ∈ Pos (t|A) ⊆ WA, so v ∈ WA. 
Then since u ∈ WA→B, u|B ∈ WB and since u|B is a P -subposition of t|B we conclude that t|B ∈ WB. 
Finally t ∈ WA→B.
• Let t be a position on A → B such that t ∈ WA→B and let u be a O-subposition of t. Let suppose that 
Pos
(
u|A
) ⊆ WA. If v ∈ Pos (t|A) and if m is the root of v, then the father of m is the root of t which 
is an O-move, and since u is a O-subthread of t, we get m ∈ u. Now the position of u|A whose root is 
m is in WA and it is a P -subposition of v, so v ∈ WA. Therefore Pos
(
t|A
) ⊆ WA, and since t ∈ WA→B
we have t|B ∈ WB. Since u|B is a O-subposition of t|B, we get u|B ∈ WB. Finally u ∈ WA→B.
• Let t be a position on A × B. t is either a position on A, either a position on B, so if u is a winning 
P -subposition of t, then either u ∈ WA, either u ∈ WB. Therefore t ∈ WA or t ∈ WB, and so t ∈ WA×B.
• Let t be a position on A × B such that t ∈ WA×B. Either t ∈ WA, either t ∈ WB, so any O-subposition 
of t is in WA or WB, so in WA×B. 
In order to deﬁne what a winning strategy is, we use a notion of augmented plays of a strategy inspired 
from [18]:
Deﬁnition 14 (Augmented play). If σ is a strategy on A and s is a play on A, then s is an augmented play
of σ if one of the following holds:
• s ∈ σ, or
• s is such that ∀t P s, t ∈ σ and ∀t ∈ σ, s  t.
In particular, in the second case of the above deﬁnition, s is either an O-play for which σ has no answer, 
either an inﬁnite play (in which case s  t ⇔ s = t and so the second condition, equivalent to s /∈ σ, is 
always true since strategies contain only ﬁnite plays). Also, because of the second condition in the second 
case, an O-play s such that smP ∈ σ for some P -move mP is not an augmented play of σ. Unlike [18], we 
consider not only odd-length extensions (with an O-move), but also inﬁnite ones.
Deﬁnition 15 (Winning strategy). If σ is a strategy on A equipped with the winning condition W, then σ is 
said to be winning if all its augmented plays are winning.
The following lemma will be useful to prove that a strategy σ is winning on (A,W).
Lemma 7. If σ is a strategy on A and if s is an augmented play of σ, then every t ∈ Threads (s) is an 
augmented play of σ
Proof.
• If s ∈ σ, then by single-threadedness of σ, Threads (s) ⊆ σ.
• If s is an O-play, then we write s = s′m with s′ ∈ σ. Let t ∈ Threads (s). If m is not a move in t, 
then t ∈ Threads (s′) ⊆ σ. If m is a move in t, then we write t = t′m, so t′ ∈ Threads (s′) ⊆ σ. If 
there is some n such that tn = t′mn ∈ σ, then Threads (s′mn) = (Threads (s′) \ {t′}) ∪ {t′mn} ⊆ σ, 
so by single-threadedness of σ, sn = s′mn ∈ σ, contradicting the fact that s is an augmented play 
of σ.
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but s′ ∈ σ, so by single-threadedness of σ t ∈ σ. If t is inﬁnite, then for all t′ P t there is some s′ P s
such that t′ ∈ Threads (s′), but s′ ∈ σ, so by single-threadedness of σ, t′ ∈ σ. 
The above result is the exact analogue of the left-to-right direction of the single-threadedness condition 
in Deﬁnition 8, but for the set of augmented plays of a strategy. The other direction is also true, but won’t 
be used. Using this lemma it is suﬃcient to prove that every augmented play of σ which is a thread (let 
us call it an augmented thread of σ) is in W in order to prove that σ is winning on (A,W). Indeed, if any 
augmented thread of σ is in W and if s is an augmented play of σ, then for any t ∈ Threads (s), t is an 
extended thread of σ by the lemma, so t ∈ W. Then Threads (s) ⊆ W so s is winning.
We now prove that the winning conditions on the arrow and product are compatible with application 
and pairing of strategies.
Lemma 8. If σ is a winning strategy on (A → B,WA→B) and τ is a winning strategy on (A,WA), then σ (τ)
is a winning strategy on (B,WB).
Proof. Let t be an augmented thread of σ (τ). Using the description of application given in Lemma 4, there 
is some augmented play u of σ such that u|A is an augmented play of τ and u|B = t. Since t is a thread, 
u is also a thread, so since σ is winning on A → B, u ∈ WA→B. u|A is an augmented play of τ which is 
winning on A, so Threads (u|A) ⊆ WA, and therefore u|B ∈ WB. Finally, t = u|B ∈ WB. Therefore σ (τ) is 
winning. 
Lemma 9. If σ is a winning strategy on (A,WA) and τ is a winning strategy on (B,WB), then 〈σ, τ〉 is a 
winning strategy on (A × B,WA×B).
Proof. Let t be an augmented thread of 〈σ, τ〉. Using the description of pairing given in Lemma 5 and the 
deﬁnition of the arena A × B, and because t is a thread, t is either an augmented thread of σ on A, in which 
case t ∈ WA, either an augmented thread of τ on B, in which case t ∈ WB. Therefore we get t ∈ WA×B, 
and so 〈σ, τ〉 is winning. 
The following lemma on the interpretation of cc illustrates the use of winning conditions and justiﬁes the 
notions of O- and P -subpositions in order to interpret classical logic through the law of Peirce.
Lemma 10. If t is an augmented thread of cc on the arena ((T → U) → T ) → T (written ((T (1) → U) →
T (2)
) → T (3)), then the positions of t|T (1) and t|T (2) are P -subpositions of t|T (3) .
Proof. cc being a total strategy, its augmented threads are even or inﬁnite. Since t is a thread and player 
never plays in U , t is a position on the subarena:
O ai
P ai Ti
O b1 . . . bn Ti
P ai ai
O Ti Ti
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ai
Ti
is one of 
the trees of the arena T , and where b1, . . . , bn are the roots of the arena U (each bi appearing zero or more 
times in t). The position t is then of the following form:
ai
ai t1 . . . tm . . . u
bk1 . . . bkm . . . u
ai . . . ai . . .
t1 . . . tm . . .
where the tj and u are positions on the arena Ti. With these notations we have:
Pos
(
t|T (1)
)
=
⎧⎨
⎩
ai
t1
; . . . ;
ai
tm
; . . .
⎫⎬
⎭ and Pos (t|T (2)) =
{
ai
u
}
which are all P -subpositions of:
t|T (3) =
ai
t1 . . . tm . . . u

It follows easily from this lemma and Lemma 6 that for any winning conditions WT and WU , cc is 
winning on the arena
(
((T → U) → T ) → T,W((T→U)→T )→T
)
Remark (WA→B versus Kleene arrow). Let A, B be arenas equipped with winning conditions WA, WB. We 
deﬁne here a strategy σ on A → B such that for any winning strategy τ on A, σ (τ) is winning on B, but σ
is not winning on A → B. Hence the arrow on winning conditions diﬀers from the usual Kleene realizability 
arrow (see [23]).
We choose A and B to be the same arena Q consisting of one root with three children ,  and , equipped 
with the winning condition
WQ =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
qO
aP1 a
P
2 . . .
| ∃i, ai ∈ {, }
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
where the positions may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. We deﬁne a strategy σ on Q → Q such that for any τ winning 
on (Q,WQ), σ (τ) is winning on (Q,WQ), but σ is not winning on (Q → Q,WQ→Q). σ is the innocent 
strategy deﬁned by the views:
Q qO P
↑
Q qP aO qP aO
Q qO P
↑
Q qP aO qP bO
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and so the projection qOP is winning, but the right view (which will never happen in an interaction with 
a single-threaded strategy) with a =  and b =  is losing, so σ is losing.
4. First-order logic
We deﬁne a realizability model for ﬁrst-order classical logic with possibilities of witness extraction. For 
that the proposition ⊥ will be mapped to an arena in general diﬀerent from V. Its associated winning 
condition will be a parameter of the model, in the spirit of [14].
Let x range over a countable set of variables, f range over a set of function symbols with ﬁxed ﬁnite 
arity and P range over a set of predicate symbols with ﬁxed ﬁnite arity. First-order terms and formulas are 
deﬁned by the following grammar:
a, b ::= x | f (a1, . . . , an)
A,B ::= ⊥ | P (a1, . . . , an) |  | A ∧ B | A ⇒ B | ∀xA
In the following we use syntactic sugar for the negation of formulas: ¬A Δ= A ⇒ ⊥ and for the existential: 
∃xA Δ= ¬∀x¬A. Let Ax be a set of closed formulas (the axioms of a theory). We use the following deduction 
system based on natural deduction with a rule for the law of Peirce. In these rules, Γ denotes a sequence of 
formulas A1, . . . , An.
Γ, A  A (A∈Ax)Γ  A Γ  ((A ⇒ B) ⇒ A) ⇒ A
Γ   Γ  A Γ  BΓ  A ∧ B
Γ  A ∧ B
Γ  A
Γ  A ∧ B
Γ  B
Γ, A  B
Γ  A ⇒ B
Γ  A ⇒ B Γ  A
Γ  B
Γ  A (x/∈FV(Γ))
Γ  ∀xA
Γ  ∀xA
Γ  A [a/x]
Remark that ⊥ has no associated rule, since the ex-falso rule has a particular status, given the interpretation 
of ⊥. This will be discussed in Sect. 4.3.
We ﬁx a countable ﬁrst-order structure interpreting the terms of our logic, that is a countable set E
together with an interpretation fE : En → E for each function symbol f of arity n. The interpretation 
is extended to every closed term: if a is a closed term of the logic, then aE denotes its interpretation in 
the ﬁrst-order structure, so aE is an element of E. It will be convenient in the following to consider terms 
with parameters in E, which are ﬁrst-order terms where some variables are substituted with elements of E. 
The interpretation extends naturally to such terms. In the same way we will also consider formulas with 
parameters: formulas in which ﬁrst-order terms may have parameters.
4.1. Realizability
We let ⊥ be an arbitrary subset of E. We can map any ﬁrst-order formula A to a simple type A∗ as 
follows:
⊥∗ = ι (P (a1, . . . , an))∗ = ι ∗ = unit (A ∧ B)∗ = A∗ × B∗
(A ⇒ B)∗ = A∗ → B∗ (∀xA)∗ = A∗
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informational content.
Recall that we omit the double bracket notation for the arenas, so a type T also denotes the associated 
arena. We ﬁx the arena associated to ι to be R
(
RE
)
, where E = {Ue | e ∈ E} is the countable family of 
empty arenas (and R = {V}). Hence ι is the usual ﬂat arena for the set E.
We deﬁne for any F ⊆ E the winning condition WF on ι by:
WF =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
qO
mP1 m
P
2 . . .
| ∃i,mi ∈ F
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
Note that it is a winning condition since the position:
qO
mP1 m
P
2 . . .
that may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite has only itself as O-subposition and
qO
mPi1 m
P
i2
. . .
for 1 ≤ i1 < i2 ≤ . . . as P -subpositions, and if ∃k, mik ∈ F then ∃i, mi ∈ F . Therefore WF is a winning 
condition on ι. Let e ∈ E. The only extended thread of the usual strategy on ι for e (the one that answers 
e to the ﬁrst opponent move) is 
q
e
, so this strategy is winning on WF as soon as e ∈ F .
We suppose given for each predicate P of arity n a set |P | of n-uples of elements of E. We can then deﬁne 
for each closed ﬁrst-order formula A with parameters a winning condition WA on the arena A∗. We deﬁne 
WA∧B = WA×B and WA⇒B = WA→B as in Deﬁnition 13, W⊥ is W⊥ (recall that ⊥  ⊆ E), and we let:
W
 = ∅ W∀xA =
⋂
e∈E
WA[e/x]
WP (a1,...,an) =
{
W⊥ if
(
aE1 , . . . , a
E
n
)
/∈ |P |
the set of all positions on ι otherwise
Note that these are indeed winning conditions. For W
, the empty set is a winning condition on U which is 
the empty arena with no position. For W∀xA, it is easy to see that an intersection of winning conditions is a 
winning condition, and for WP (a1,...,an) and W⊥ this is because WF is a winning condition for any F ⊆ E, 
and the set of all positions on ι is trivially a winning condition on ι.
Taking W
 = ∅ may seem surprising at ﬁrst, but remember that ∗ = unit is the empty arena with no 
threads ( is not a thread since Threads () = ∅), so W
 = ∅ is the only possibility. Nevertheless the only 
strategy on U , which is {}, is trivially winning since Threads () = ∅.
We can now deﬁne our notion of realizability:
Deﬁnition 16 (Realizability relation). If A is a closed ﬁrst-order formula with parameters and if σ is a strategy 
on A∗, then σ realizes A (denoted σ  A) if σ is a winning strategy on (A∗,WA).
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gies.
Lemma 11. If A is a closed formula with parameters, then λx.x on A∗ → A∗ is a realizer for the formula 
A ⇒ A.
Proof. Let A∗(1) → A∗(2) denote the arena A∗ → A∗. Let t be an augmented thread of λx.x such that 
Threads
(
t|A∗(1)
)
⊆ WA Since t is a thread, t|A∗(2) is a thread and t|A∗(1) = t|A∗(2) is also a thread. Then 
t|A∗(1) ∈ WA, so t|A∗(2) = t|A∗(1) ∈ WA. 
The following result is a consequence of the remark following Lemma 10.
Lemma 12. If A and B are closed formulas with parameters, then:
cc  ((A ⇒ B) ⇒ A) ⇒ A
4.2. Adequacy for minimal classical logic
We now show that realizability is compatible with deduction in minimal classical logic. Full classical logic 
is discussed in Sect. 4.3.
4.2.1. Translation of proofs to strategies
We use λμ-calculus and its interpretation in RFam(C) ∼= C to map a ﬁrst-order proof to a typed λμ-term 
which is then interpreted in C as a strategy.
Assume given a constant kA of type A∗ for each A ∈ Ax. We map a derivation ν of A1, . . . , An  A to a 
typed λμ-term ν∗ of type A∗ with free variables in xA1∗ , . . . , xAn∗ as follows:
Γ, A  A  xA
∗ (A∈Ax)
Γ  A  kA
Γ  ((A ⇒ B) ⇒ A) ⇒ A  cc (see (4))
Γ    ∗
ν
Γ  A
ν′
Γ  B
Γ  A ∧ B

〈
ν∗, ν′∗
〉
ν
Γ  A ∧ B
Γ  A
 π1ν∗
ν
Γ  A ∧ B
Γ  B
 π2ν∗
ν
Γ, A  B
Γ  A ⇒ B
 λxA∗ .ν∗
ν
Γ  A ⇒ B
ν′
Γ  A
Γ  B
 ν∗ ν′∗
ν
Γ  A (x/∈FV(Γ))
Γ  ∀xA
 ν∗
ν
Γ  ∀xA
Γ  A [a/x]
 ν∗
4.2.2. Adequacy
We now prove that the strategies interpreting the proofs are realizers of the proved formula. If A is 
a formula and θ an assignment of elements of E to variables, then A [θ] is the formula with parameters 
obtained by replacing each ﬁrst-order variable of A with its image by θ.
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of the sequent Γ  A and if θ is an assignment of elements of E to free variables of Γ, A, then ν∗ is a 
winning strategy on Γ∗ → A∗ equipped with WΓ[θ]⇒A[θ].
Proof. We prove the property by induction on the proof tree. For the axiom rules, we use in one case 
Lemma 11, and in the other case this is an assumption of the lemma. The adequacy for the law of Peirce 
comes from Lemma 10 and that of the introduction rule of  is immediate since Threads (∗) = ∅. The 
introduction of ∧ follows from Lemma 9, the elimination of ⇒ from Lemma 8 and for its introduction the 
induction property doesn’t change. The remaining rules are the elimination of ∧ and the introduction and 
elimination of ∀:
• For the ﬁrst elimination rule of ∧, let ν be a proof of Γ  A ∧ B. An augmented thread of π1ν∗
is an augmented thread of ν∗ which is a thread on Γ∗ → A∗, so by Deﬁnition 13 it is winning on 
Γ [θ] ⇒ A [θ] ∧ B [θ]
• The case of the second elimination rule of ∧ is similar
• For the introduction of ∀, let ν be a proof of Γ  A with x /∈ FV (Γ). If t is an augmented thread of ν∗
such that:
Threads
(
t|Γ∗
) ⊆ WΓ[θ]
Let e ∈ E and let θ′ = θ ∪ {x → e}. Since x /∈ FV (Γ), Γ [θ′] = Γ [θ] so:
Threads
(
t|Γ∗
) ⊆ WΓ[θ′]
And by induction hypothesis t|A∗ ∈ WA[θ′]. Since A [θ′] = A [e/x] [θ], we get that for all e ∈ E, 
t|A∗ ∈ WA[e/x][θ], and so t|A∗ ∈ W(∀xA)[θ]
• For the elimination of ∀, let ν be a proof of Γ  ∀xA and let a be a ﬁrst-order term. If t is an augmented 
thread of ν∗ such that:
Threads
(
t|Γ∗
) ⊆ WΓ[θ]
Then by induction hypothesis, since (a [θ])E ∈ E we get:
t|A∗ ∈ WA[(a[θ])E/x][θ]
which terminates the proof since A 
[
(a [θ])E /x
]
[θ] = (A [a/x]) [θ]. 
4.3. Full classical logic
In order to get full classical logic we need to add an ex-falso rule. However since the arena ⊥∗ is not the 
empty arena U (see Sect. 4.1), we have to ensure that (ι,W⊥) is included in (A∗,WA) for any formula A. This 
means that ι is a subarena of A∗, so a position on ι is in particular a position on A∗, and that W⊥ ⊆ WA. 
This result is obtained for formulas not of the form A ⇒ ∧ . . .∧ by an easy induction on formulas, since 
the winning conditions associated to atomic formulas diﬀerent from  are either W⊥ , either every position 
on ι. Formulas of the form A ⇒  ∧ . . . ∧  being trivially derivable, we can add to our deduction system 
the following rule:
Γ  ⊥
Γ  A
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λμ-terms (or replaced with a trivial derivation for formulas of the form A ⇒ ∧ . . .∧). The corresponding 
adequacy lemma is immediate from Lemma 13.
4.4. First-order logic with equality
We now show how to handle equality. We suppose that our ﬁrst-order language contains an inequality 
predicate = of arity 2 for which we use inﬁx notation. As stated in Sect. 4.1, this predicate is interpreted 
with the base type ι. The set of pairs associated to = is:
|=| = {(e, f) ∈ E2 | e = f}
In the following we use the notation (a = b) Δ= ¬ (a = b). The following lemma states that the equations 
which are satisﬁed in the model are trivially realized:
Lemma 14. Let a, b be ﬁrst-order terms with free variables x1, . . . , xn. If:
∀e1, . . . , en ∈ E, (a [e1/x1, . . . en/xn])E = (b [e1/x1, . . . en/xn])E
then:
λx.x  ∀x1 . . .∀xn a = b
Proof. We write x for x1 . . . xn and e for e1 . . . en. λx.x is a strategy on the arena:
ι(1) → ι(2)
Let t be an extended thread of that strategy, let e ∈ E and let suppose that t|ι(1) is winning on a [e/x] =
b [e/x]. Since t is a thread, t|ι(2) is a thread, and t|ι(1) = t|ι(2) is also a thread. Therefore we have t|ι(1) ∈
Wa[e/x] =b[e/x]. Since by hypothesis (a [e/x])E = (b [e/x])E , we have Wa[e/x] =b[e/x] = W⊥ , so t|ι(2) = t|ι(1) ∈
W⊥ . 
The axioms for equality are:
(refl) ∀x (x = x) (Leib) ∀x ∀y (¬A [x] ⇒ A [y] ⇒ x = y)
Recall that ∀x (x = x) is only syntactic sugar for ∀x (x = x ⇒ ⊥), and that ∀x∀y (¬A [x] ⇒ A [y] ⇒ x = y)
is also syntactic sugar for:
∀x∀y ((A [x] ⇒ ⊥) ⇒ A [y] ⇒ x = y)
Lemma 15. Let ⊥  ⊆ E.
1. The strategy λx.x on ι → ι is a realizer of (refl)
2. The strategy λx.x on (A∗ → ι) → A∗ → ι is a realizer of (Leib)
Proof.
1. This is a consequence of Lemma 14.
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(
A∗(1) → ι(1)
)
→ A∗(2) → ι(2)
then t is even or inﬁnite (since λx.x is total) and veriﬁes t|A∗(1)→ι(1) = t|A∗(2)→ι(2) . Let e, f ∈ E. 
Suppose t|A∗(1)→ι(1) is winning on ¬A [e] and t|A∗(2) is winning on A [f ]. Since t is a thread, t|A∗(2)→ι(2)
is a thread so t|A∗(1)→ι(1) = t|A∗(2)→ι(2) is also a thread. This means that
t|A∗(1)→ι(1) ∈ WA[e]→⊥
We have to show then that t|ι(2) ∈ We =f . We distinguish two cases:
• e = f : any position is in We =f so in particular t|ι(2) ∈ We =f
• e = f : Since e = f , WA[e] = WA[f ], and since t|A∗(1)→ι(1) = t|A∗(2)→ι(2) ,
Threads
(
t|A∗(1)
)
= Threads
(
t|A∗(2)
)
so t|A∗(1) is winning on A [e]. Since t|A∗(1)→ι(1) ∈ WA[e]→⊥, we get t|ι(1) ∈ W⊥ = W⊥ . Since e = f , 
We =f = W⊥ , therefore
t|ι(2) = t|ι(1) ∈ We =f 
5. Peano arithmetic
We now proceed to the realizability interpretation of full Peano arithmetic.
5.1. Deﬁnitions
Our ﬁrst-order language is built from the function symbols 0 of arity 0, S of arity 1, and + and × of 
arity 2. The only predicate symbol is = of arity 2. This choice of function symbols is only for simplicity, 
and we could choose to have all the symbols of primitive recursive functions.
We also ﬁx the structure interpreting the terms of the logic to be the set of natural numbers N. The 
symbols 0, S, + and × are interpreted the standard way. As stated in Sect. 4.1, = and ⊥ are both interpreted 
as ι, and the associated arena in RFam(C) is ι = R
(
RN
)
where N = {Un | n ∈ N}. Hence the type of natural 
numbers is interpreted as the negative translation of N. Note that this is the usual ﬂat arena of natural 
numbers:
q
0 · · · n · · ·
This diﬀers from Laird’s interpretation of PCF with control [16], where the base type of natural numbers 
is interpreted by the arena (ι → ι) → ι.
5.2. The relativization predicate
In the setting presented before, a realizer of ∀xA had to be uniform, meaning that it had to be a realizer 
of A [n/x] for any n ∈ N. This choice suﬃces to realize the rules of ﬁrst-order logic and Leibniz equality, but 
when it comes to Peano arithmetic, and more particularly to the axiom scheme of induction, we need to have 
a diﬀerent notion of a realizer of ∀xA. Indeed, we realize the axiom scheme of induction using the recursor 
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want a realizer of ∀xA to be a strategy that, given an element n ∈ N, provides a realizer of A [n/x]. Instead 
of changing the realizability semantics of quantiﬁers, we add a syntactic construction for relativization. We 
follow [20] and extend the syntax of formulas by:
A,B ::= . . . | {a} ⇒ A
We use syntactic sugar: ∀rxA Δ= ∀x ({x} ⇒ A) and ∃rxA Δ= ¬∀rx¬A. We extend our notion of context so 
Γ may now contain some ﬁrst-order variables, along with formulas. These variables appearing in Γ are the 
relativized ones. To introduce and eliminate our new construct, we add the rules:
Γ, x  A
Γ  {x} ⇒ A
Γ  {a} ⇒ A
(FV(a)⊆Γ)
Γ  A
The translations of the new formulas are ({a} ⇒ A)∗ = ι → A∗, and the associated winning conditions 
are W{a}⇒A = W{aN}→A, which are deﬁned since 
{
aN
} ⊆ N (see Sect. 4.1). The ex-falso rule is still valid, 
thanks to the restriction of {a} being on the left of an arrow.
In order to deﬁne the translation of the new rules into λμ-calculus, we associate to each ﬁrst-order term 
a with free variables x1, . . . , xn a λμ term a∗ with free variables xι1, . . . , xιn and no free name. For that we 
assume a given constant kf of type ι → . . . → ι → ι (n + 1 times) for each function symbol f of arity n. a∗
is then deﬁned by induction: x∗ = xι and (f (a1, . . . , an))∗ = kf a1∗ . . . an∗.
Since the context Γ may now contain ﬁrst-order variables, we deﬁne a new mapping from ﬁrst-order 
proofs to λμ-terms: if ν is a derivation of:
x1, . . . , xm, A1, . . . , An  A
then ν∗ is a typed λμ-term of type A∗ with free variables in xι1, . . ., xιm, xA1
∗
, . . ., xAn∗ . The translation for 
the rules of the base system doesn’t change, and the new rules are translated to:
ν
Γ, x  A
Γ  {x} ⇒ A
 λx.ν∗
ν
Γ  {a} ⇒ A
(FV(a)⊆Γ)
Γ  A
 ν∗a∗
We now deﬁne the interpretations of the constants kf of λμ-calculus as strategies. In fact, we ﬁrst deﬁne 
strategies for any function from Nn to N and then we use the interpretation fN to deﬁne kf.
In Fam (C) a morphism from Nn = {Un1 × . . . × Unn | (n1, . . . , nn) ∈ Nn} to N = {Un | n ∈ N} is given 
by a function from Nn to N together with a strategy from U × . . . × U = U to U . Since there is only one 
such strategy, such a morphism is just given by a function from Nn to N. We will denote these morphisms 
τg for g : Nn → N. From τg : Nn → N we deﬁne σg : ι → . . . → ι → ι (n + 1 times) by:
σg = λxι1 . . . xιnyR
N
.x1
(
λzN1 .x2
(
λzN2 . . . . .xn
(
λzEn .y (τgz1 . . . zn)
)
. . .
))
In particular, if n ∈ N then σn is the strategy on ι which answers n to the initial move. The following lemma 
states that the strategies σg indeed compute the correct values:
Lemma 16. Let g : Nn → N and n1, . . . , nn ∈ N. σg is winning on:(
ι → . . . → ι → ι,W{n1}→...→{nn}→{g(n1,...,nn)}
)
Proof. We prove the lemma for n = 2 for clarity. In that case, σg is a strategy on ι(1) → ι(2) → ι(3). Let t be 
an extended thread of σg, let n, n′ ∈ E and let suppose that t|ι(1) is winning on W{n} and t|ι(2) is winning 
on W{n′}. The position corresponding to t has the following shape:
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q q . . . . . . q c11 . . . c1p1 . . . cm1 . . . cmpm
a1 . . . an b11 . . . b1p1 bm1 . . . bmpm
where cij = g (ai, bij). t|ι(1) is the following position:
q
a1 . . . am
Since t|ι(1) ∈ W{n}, there is some i such that ai is labeled with n. Since t|ι(2) is winning on W{n′}, the 
following thread of t|ι(2) :
q
bi1 . . . bipi
is in particular in W{n′}, so there must be some j such that bij is labeled with n′. But then since cij =
g (n, n′), we get that t|ι(3) ∈ W{g(n,n′)}. 
The constants kf of λμ-calculus are then interpreted by kf = σfN . The formulation of the adequacy 
lemma in our new system reads as follows:
Lemma 17. Let ⊥  ⊆ N. Suppose that we have a realizer kA for each formula A ∈ Ax. If ν is a derivation 
of the sequent:
x1, . . . , xm, A1, . . . , An  A
and if θ is an assignment of elements of N to free variables of A1, . . . , An, A, then ν∗ is a winning strategy 
on the arena:
ι(1) → . . . → ι(m) → A1∗ → . . . → An∗ → A∗
equipped with winning condition:
W{θ(x1)}→...→{θ(xm)}→A1[θ]⇒...⇒An[θ]⇒A[θ]
Proof. The case of the rules of the base system are unchanged. Therefore we prove the adequacy for the two 
new rules. For the introduction of relativization, the induction property is unchanged. For the elimination of 
relativization, let ν be a proof of x1, . . . , xm, A1, . . . An  {a} ⇒A with FV (a) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm}. By induction 
on a, using Lemma 16, a∗ is winning on:
{θ (x1)} → · · · → {θ (xm)} →
{
(a [θ])N
}
and we can conclude using Lemma 8. 
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The winning conditions for ⊥ and e = f are as in Sects. 4.1 and 4.4. The axioms are the ones for equality 
(deﬁned in Sect. 4.4) and:
(Snz) ∀x (S (x) = 0) (Sinj) ∀x∀y (x = y ⇒ S (x) = S (y))
(+0) ∀x (x + 0 = x) (×0) ∀x (x × 0 = 0)
(+S) ∀x∀y (x + S (y) = S (x + y)) (×S) ∀x∀y (x × S (y) = x + (x × y))
(ind) ∀z (A[0/x] ⇒ ∀rx (A ⇒ A [S (x) /x]) ⇒ ∀rxA)
where A is a formula with free variables among x, z. We will now deﬁne the realizers for these axioms. We 
ﬁrst deﬁne ρT , the recursor on type T , which is the usual recursor of Gödel’s system T. For that we deﬁne 
for each n ∈ N and simple type T a strategy ρTn by:
ρT0 = λxy.x : T → (ι → T → T ) → T
ξT = λnrxy.y n (r x y) : ι → (T → (ι → T → T ) → T ) → T → (ι → T → T ) → T
ρTn+1 = ξT (σn)
(
ρTn
)
: T → (ι → T → T ) → T
and we ﬁnally deﬁne the strategy ρT as the innocent strategy whose views are:
T → (ι → T → T ) → ι → T
qO
qP
nO
s
where qO s is a view of ρTn on the subarena T → (ι → T → T ) → T .
We use the following lemma in order to prove the validity of (ind):
Lemma 18. Let A be a formula with parameters and one free variable.
1. ρA∗0 is a realizer of A [0] ⇒ ∀rx (A [x] ⇒ A [S (x)]) ⇒ A [0]
2. ξA∗ is a realizer of:
∀ry( (A [0] ⇒ ∀rx (A [x] ⇒ A [S (x)]) ⇒ A [y]) ⇒ A [0] ⇒ ∀rx (A [x] ⇒ A [S (x)]) ⇒ A [S y] )
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 13, since the strategies ρA∗0 and ξA
∗ are the interpre-
tations of proofs of the formulas. 
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We prove that all the axioms are realized:
Lemma 19. Let ⊥  ⊆ N.
1. The empty strategy on ι is a realizer of (Snz)
2. The strategy λx.x on ι → ι is a realizer of (Sinj)
3. The strategy λx.x on ι → ι is a realizer of (+0), (×0), (+S) and (×S)
4. ρA∗ is a realizer of (ind)
Proof.
1. The only extended thread t of the empty strategy on ι is the one-move thread. We have to show that 
for any n ∈ N, t ∈ WS(n)=0. Let n ∈ N. Then we have (S (n))N = n + 1 = 0 = 0N and WS(n)=0 is the set 
of all positions on ι. In particular t, which is the one-move position, is in WSN(n)=0.
2. If t is an extended thread of λx.x on ι(1) → ι(2), then t is even or inﬁnite (since the strategy is total), 
so t|ι(1) = t|ι(2) . t being a thread, t|ι(2) is a thread, and t|ι(1) = t|ι(2) is also a thread. Let m, n ∈ N. We 
have to show that if t|ι(1) ∈ Wm=n, then t|ι(2) ∈ WS(n)=S(m). We have m = n ⇔ (S (n))N = (S (m))N so 
Wm=n = WS(n)=S(m) so we can conclude.
3. This is a consequence of Lemma 14.
4. We ﬁrst prove by induction on n ∈ N that ρA∗n is a realizer of the formula
A [0] ⇒ ∀rx (A [x] ⇒ A [S (x)]) ⇒ A [n]
where A is a formula with parameters and one free variable.
• The case for 0 is the ﬁrst part of Lemma 18
• By induction hypothesis we have:
ρA
∗
n  A [0] ⇒ ∀rx (A [x] ⇒ A [S (x)]) ⇒ A [n]
and by Lemma 18 we have:
ξT  ∀ry( (A [0] ⇒ ∀rx (A [x] ⇒ A [S (x)]) ⇒ A [y]) ⇒ A [0] ⇒ ∀rx (A [x] ⇒ A [S (x)]) ⇒ A [S (y)] )
so since ρTn+1 = ξT (σn)
(
ρTn
)
, we get by Lemmas 16 and 8:
ρA
∗
n+1  A [0] ⇒ ∀rx (A [x] ⇒ A [S (x)]) ⇒ A [S (n)]
which terminates the induction case since n + 1 = (S (n))N.
Let now t be an augmented thread of ρA∗ on the arena
A∗(1) →
(
ι(1) → A∗(2) → A∗(3)
)
→ ι(2) → A∗(4)
Let suppose that t|A∗(1) is winning on A [0] and t|ι(1)→A∗(2)→A∗(3) is winning on ∀rx (A [x] ⇒ A [S (x)]). 
We want to prove that t|ι(2)→A∗(4) is winning on ∀rxA [x], so let n ∈ N and let suppose that t|ι(2) is 
winning on 
(
ι,W{n}
)
. Then there must be some nO in t|ι(2) . Let u be the subsequence of t consisting of 
the initial qO, the following qP , this nO and all the moves of t such that the view obtained immediately 
after having been played contains nO. Then u is a play of ρA∗n . Since a P -move does not change the 
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of polarities), so they are winning on A [0], and the positions of u|ι(1)→A∗(2)→A∗(3) are O-subpositions of 
t|ι(1)→A∗(2)→A∗(3) , so they are winning on ∀rx (A [x] ⇒ A [S (x)]). Then by the property on ρA
∗
n , u|A∗(4)
is winning on A [n]. But u|A∗(4) is a P -subposition of t|A∗(4) (no inversion here), so t|A∗(4) is winning on 
A [n]. 
We deﬁne for a formula A of Peano Arithmetic its relativization Ar which is obtained by replacing every 
∀ by a ∀r. The following result is easy to obtain, by replacing every rule about ∀ by two rules: one about ∀
and one about the relativization construct. It is also easy to derive Ar from A for each A ∈ Ax, except the 
induction scheme, which is already relativized. Therefore we have the following result:
Theorem 1. If A is provable in Peano arithmetic then Ar is provable in our system, so there is a computable 
strategy σ such that σ  Ar.
5.5. Extraction
We now show that from any Π02-formula provable in Peano arithmetic we can extract a computable 
witnessing function.
Suppose that we have a proof of  ∀rx∃ry (a = b). We obtain by double-negation elimination a proof of 
 ∀rx (¬∀ry (a = b)), and we map it to a strategy σ such that:
σ  ∀rx (¬∀ry (a = b)) ≡ ∀rx (∀ry (a = b) ⇒ ⊥)
Then if n ∈ N, by Lemmas 16 and 8, σ (σn)  ∀ry (a [n/x] = b [n/x]) ⇒ ⊥. Let now ﬁx ⊥  ={
m ∈ N | (a [n/x,m/y])N = (b [n/x,m/y])N
}
. By a simple disjunction of cases we get
λx.x  ∀ry (a [n/x] = b [n/x])
therefore by Lemma 8, σ (σn) (λx.x)  ⊥. Then σ (σn) (λx.x) is some σm such that m ∈ ⊥ . Indeed, if 
σ (σn) (λx.x) is the empty strategy then its only augmented play is qO, which is losing on ⊥.
6. Conclusion & future work
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
We have built a realizability model for Peano arithmetic using winning conditions on arenas, and have 
used it in the context of witness extraction for Π02-formulas. Future work will be the comparison of the 
present model with the game interpretation of classical arithmetic of [7]. Our main goal is to compare two 
diﬀerent versions of realizers for the axiom of dependent choices: the modiﬁed bar recursion of [3] and the 
clock of [13].
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